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The	pitfalls	and	possibilities	of	coronabonds
The	Covid-19	crisis	has	renewed	calls	for	the	creation	of	common	bonds	for	member
states	of	the	Eurozone.	However,	as	Zarko	Kalamov	and	Klaas	Staal	explain,	common
bonds	would	have	potentially	far-reaching	implications.	They	outline	some	of	the	existing
proposals,	identify	their	weaknesses	and	propose	some	possible	solutions.
Currently,	we	are	in	a	state	of	crisis,	with	sweeping	economic	consequences.	To	mitigate
these	consequences,	governments	are	proposing	costly	fiscal	stimulus	measures.	Financing	these	measures	is
expected	to	involve	additional	public	borrowing.	As	the	financial	positions	of	European	countries	vary	widely,	this
borrowing	comes	at	low	cost	to	some,	but	likely	entails	prohibitively	high	costs	for	other	governments.
One	of	the	proposed	policy	responses	is	therefore	the	mutualisation	of	public	debt,	in	the	form	of	so-called
Eurobonds	or	coronabonds.	Because	these	bonds	would	be	backed	by	all	member	states,	they	should	have	a	high
credit	rating	and	low	interest	costs.	Depending	on	the	implementation	of	common	bonds,	however,	this	could	imply
moral-hazard	and	redistributive	consequences	that	have	far-reaching	implications	for	public	support	for	cooperation
in	the	European	Union.
One	option	for	introducing	common	bonds	would	be	the	full	substitution	of	common	bonds	for	national	bonds	with
several	and	joint	guarantees.	This	means	that	every	country	would	be	fully	responsible	for	the	debt	of	others.	The
implication	is	that	interest	rates	for	all	countries	would	be	equal;	whenever	a	country	does	not	service	its	debt	then
all	the	others	would	be	obliged	by	the	joint	guarantees	to	pay.	The	amount	of	a	country’s	borrowing	would	no	longer
affect	the	rate	of	interest	it	has	to	pay	on	its	debt.	This	would	thus	remove	the	incentive	to	limit	public	debt,	and
hence	induce	a	large	moral	hazard	problem.
Video	conference	between	EU	Economic	and	Finance	Ministers	on	16	April	2020,	Credit:	 European	Union
The	same	effect	emerges	if	the	European	Central	Bank	(ECB)	purchases	the	bonds.	It	has	been	argued	that	“this
step	would	make	them	[Eurobonds]	risk-free”.	These	bonds	are	not	risk-free,	however,	as	countries	may	still	default.
It	is	also	not	true	that,	however	implemented,	Eurobonds	do	not	have	distributional	consequences.	This	is	obviously
clear	when	countries,	in	the	case	of	a	default,	have	to	repay	the	debts	of	others.	It	is	also	the	case	when	these
bonds	“remain	on	the	central	bank’s	balance	sheet	until	the	end	of	time”.	The	ECB	is	owned	by	the	national	central
banks,	and	these	are	ultimately	owned	by	the	citizens	of	the	member	states	of	the	Eurozone.	Adding	bonds	below
market	value	(and	that	is	what	buying	bonds	with	a	low	credit	rating	until	the	market	rate	falls	to	the	risk-free	interest
rate	implies)	thus	ultimately	comes	at	a	loss	for	citizens.	The	benefits	of	putting	bonds	on	the	ECB’s	balance	sheet
are	for	those	paying	at	a	level	higher	than	the	risk-free	rate	–	again,	this	is	only	a	subset	of	the	member	states	of
the	Eurozone.
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Another	option	is	the	so-called	blue-red	approach.	In	this	approach,	there	is	partial	substitution	of	common	bonds
for	national	bonds	with	joint	guarantees.	Up	to	a	certain	limit	(for	example,	60%	of	GDP),	countries	issue	common
or	“blue”	bonds.	Once	this	threshold	is	reached,	governments	issue	national	or	“red”	bonds.	This	implies	fewer
moral	hazard	problems,	as	interest	rates	increase	if	countries	overborrow.	The	blue-red	proposal	also	carries	fewer
redistributive	consequences	than	full	substitution	by	common	bonds.	It	is	questionable,	however,	whether	the
ceiling	is	politically	stable.	Due	to	the	joint	guarantees,	there	would	be	a	large	wedge	between	the	interest	on	“blue”
and	the	“red”	bonds	creating	large	political	pressures	on	increasing	the	ceiling.
A	third	approach	introduces	partial	substitution	of	common	bonds	for	national	bonds	with	several	but	not	joint
guarantees.	Common	bonds	would	be	senior	to	the	national	bonds,	and	countries	would	have	to	guarantee	only	a
part	of	the	total	amount	of	common	bonds	issued.	This	part	is	proportional	to	the	issuance	of	common	bonds	by	a
country.	This	lowers	the	moral	hazard,	since	overborrowing	by	a	country	is	not	covered	by	the	guarantees	and	thus
is	done	at	a	higher	interest	rate,	reducing	overborrowing.
This	higher	rate	is,	however,	only	charged	for	the	additional	borrowing	and	this	type	of	common	bond	thus	lowers
the	total	cost	of	borrowing.	The	total	costs	of	servicing	the	debt	decrease,	and	a	country	has	less	to	gain	from	a
bailout.	This	reduces	the	number	of	bailouts	and	thus	the	redistributional	consequences.	This	also	reduces	the
costs	of	bailouts	for	the	fiscally	sound	countries	compared	to	the	current	situation,	giving	these	countries	an
incentive	to	adopt	these	common	bonds.
Summarising	the	above	discussion,	introducing	common	bonds	can	indeed	give	countries	the	fiscal	space	to
respond	appropriately	to	the	Covid-19	pandemic.	This	obviously	benefits	fiscally	constrained	countries.	Common
bonds	can	also	be	in	the	interest	of	fiscally	sound	countries	who	would	benefit	from	an	appropriate	response	and
from	avoiding	bailouts	that	would	take	place	without	these	bonds.	The	increased	fiscal	possibilities,	however,	also
create	a	moral	hazard	of	overspending	and	overborrowing.
To	mitigate	this,	common	bonds	should	be	carefully	crafted	and	limited	to	a	temporary	measure.	Another	relevant
observation	is	that	the	introduction	of	common	bonds	does	not	require	the	introduction	of	a	common	EU	tax
instrument.	Such	an	instrument	can	further	stoke	anti-EU	sentiment,	reinforcing	the	public	backlash	against
redistributional	transfers	between	EU	countries.
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